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The objective of the paper is to present an application of wavelet analysis to the forecasts of Muslim population for 30 European countries. We estimate the future years when the Muslim population will be majority population for 30 European countries.
The methodology, improved with a de-noising and compression step, is derived from Rostan and Rostan a and requires five steps illustrated with the time series of the Europe total population 30 countries.
Figure 1 illustrates the series of the total population and the year age group from to by step of Five years 14 data released by the Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat. The year age group is involved in the 5-step methodology since we assume that the year age group is a good proxy after adjustment for scale of the fertility rate.
Figure 1 illustrates two opposite trends, a growing European total population but a declining year age group which, as a proxy of the fertility rate, is doomed to decline in the future. We clearly anticipate that the European population 30 countries will get older in future years. However, there is an external factor not reflected by these historical data, the recent inflow of Muslim refugees following the European refugee crisis which has started in and that may revert the trend of the fertility rate, assuming that the Muslim population has higher fertility one child more per woman, on average than other Europeans, mirroring a global pattern Pew Research Centre, We compute the first-order difference of the European total population series to transform non-stationary series into stationary series.
We apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to the time series before and after differentiation: before differentiation, the time series are non-stationary i. The choice of this transformation relies on the fact that wavelet analysis presents a more accurate forecasting ability with stationary time series rather than non-stationary time series. Refer for example to Rostan and Rostan a for a demonstration.
We then de-noise the series using a one-dimensional de-noising and compression-oriented function using wavelets. The de-noising objective is to suppress the noise part of the signal s and to recover f. The de-noising procedure proceeds in three steps: Decomposition. We choose the wavelet sym4 and choose the level 2-decomposition.
Sym4 is a symlets wavelet of order 4 used as the mother wavelet for decomposition and reconstruction. It is a nearly symmetrical wavelet belonging to the family of Symlets proposed by Daubechies We compute the wavelet decomposition of the signal s at Level 2.
Detail coefficients thresholding. For each level from 1 to 2, we select a threshold and apply soft thresholding to the detail coefficients. We compute wavelet reconstruction based on the original approximation coefficients of level 2 and the modified detail coefficients of levels from 1 to 2.
For each level from 1 to 2, a threshold is selected and hard thresholding is applied to the detail coefficients. The difference with the de-noising procedure is found in Step 2. The notion behind compression is based on the concept that the regular signal component can be accurately approximated using a small number of approximation coefficients at a suitably selected level and some of the detail coefficients.
We illustrate in Figures 2 appendix material the European total population 14 data before differentiation top figure , after differentiation middle and after de-noising and compression bottom. We decompose the signal after being differentiated, de-noised and compressed.
The signal, i. The Discrete Wavelet Transform is a kind of decomposition scheme evaluated by passing the signal through lowpass and highpass filters Corinthios, , dividing it into a lower frequency band and an upper band. Each band is subsequently divided into a second level lower and upper bands. The lower band is referred to as the approximation cA and the upper band as the detail cD.
The two sequences cA and cD are downsampled. The downsampling is costly in terms of data: with multilevel decomposition, at each one-level of decomposition the sample size is reduced by half in fact, slightly more than half the length of the original signal, since the filtering process is implemented by convolving the signal with a filter.
Therefore, the decomposition can proceed only until the individual details consist of a single sample. Thus, the number of levels of decomposition will be limited by the initial number of data of the signal. In this paper, we apply a level of decomposition that fits best the data of each variable as explained at the end of the Methodology section. We observe in Figures 3 that details cDs are small and look like high-frequency noise, whereas the approximation cA4 contains less noise than does the initial signal.
In addition, the higher the level of decomposition, the lower the noise generated by details. For a better understanding of signal decomposition using discrete wavelet transform, refer to the methodology section of Rostan and Rostan a. We apply Burg extension to cA and cD. For instance, in , when forecasting European total population for the subsequent years, the optimal pth order is Given x the decomposed signal which is cA or cD , we generate a vector a of all-pole filter coefficients that model an input data sequence using the Levinson-Durbin algorithm Levinson, ; Durbin, We use the Burg model to fit a pth order autoregressive AR model to the input signal, x , by minimizing least squares the forward and backward prediction errors while constraining the AR parameters to satisfy the Levinson-Durbin recursion.
Since the method characterizes the input data using an all-pole model, the correct choice of the model order p is important. IIR filters are digital filters with infinite impulse response. Unlike finite impulse response FIR filter, IIR filter has the feedback a recursive part of a filter and is also known as recursive digital filter. After reconstruction, we retransform the time series of the first-order difference of European total population into European total population absolute level.
As expected the uptrend of the total population and the downtrend of the year age group are confirmed, which will make the European population getting older. Once we have forecasted the European total population 30 countries and the age group of the European population 30 countries following the four-step methodology, we forecast the Muslim population in a zero-migration scenario: we assume that all refugee flows will stop after , which is considered the most conservative approach.
The year is the base year of our forecasts. Assuming that the Muslim population has higher fertility one child more per woman, on average than other Europeans, mirroring a global pattern Pew Research Centre, , we will compute the newborn Muslim babies every five years.
For example, assuming that in the proportion of Muslims is 5 per cent for the entire European Muslim population 30 countries , 5 per cent of ,, is 24,,, the total number of European Muslims in year In year , five year later, 5 per cent of ,,, the forecasted value obtained with spectral analysis, is 24,, We assume that the proportion of Muslim babies between year and is also 5 per cent.
The proportion of 5. Finally, we illustrate the forecasts of the European Muslim total population versus the European total population 30 countries in Figure 7. The European Muslim population should more than tripled 3. To the Muslim population obtained in the Zero-migration Scenario in section 3.
Figure 8 illustrates the number of first-time asylum applicants in in 30 countries Eurostat, Germany 31 per cent of the total first-time asylum applicants , Italy 18 per cent , France 14 per cent and Greece 8 per cent received most of the first-time asylum applicants 70 per cent and will therefore be the most impacted by this scenario.
We use the number of first-time asylum applicants as a proxy of the annual flow of migrants, assumed to be continuous and constant in the subsequent years. Based on the top ten origins of refugees from to , 86 per cent of them are Muslims Pew Research Centre, We will therefore assume that 86 per cent of the first-time asylum applicants are Muslims. We illustrate in Figure 9 the trend of the number of first-time asylum applicants for the 30 countries between and There is a net decline per cent between year the peak of the refugee crisis and following drastic plans to stop the influx of refugees in many countries.
The choice of the year as a proxy is explained by the fact that 1 it is the most recent known data and 2 the point is aligned with points to as illustrated by the dot line joining points and in Figure 9. Although the trend of the number of first time asylum applicants is positive, we assume in this scenario a flat trend of the number asylum applicants in future years based on year data. The mid-point migration scenario data are obtained by averaging the data of the two previous scenarios.
An additional exercise is to assess the forecasting ability of spectrum analysis. We measure the forecasting error over the last five in-sample data of European total population time series for 30 countries for the years , , , and We use the Root Mean Error Square criteria forecasts versus historical data to compute the error of forecasting.
Immigrants hurried to bring over their families. These measures produced significant quantitative and qualitative effects. Statistically, the sheer size of the migrant population increased considerably in the s and the s. Economically, the number of workers among migrants dwindled drastically. Sociologically, there has been a process of feminisation of the migration stocks while the presence of children inaugurated the second-generation phase.
All of these transformations produced unforeseen effects. Secondly, the visibility of migrants in public space increased veiled women, children going to school, etc. Thirdly, immigrant families congregated in certain areas where they could find informal support structures and social networks.
Families could thus keep in constant contact with their home countries by phone, internet or travel. The EU faces a daunting challenge, since defensive and protective policies in the Mediterranean did not succeed in deterring asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. Finally, in the last three decades, marriage immigration peaked as the first and second-generation youth entered the marriage market.
To take just two examples from Holland, between and , Turkish marriage immigration peaked at 4. Obviously, marriage immigration has maintained the migration dynamic intact. This significantly differentiates Muslim immigration to Europe with the Muslim expatriation in the USA on two grounds. Finally, the rate of mixed marriages in the USA is higher than in Europe.
This differentiation explains, to a certain extent, why Islam and Muslims in the United States are not a major concern while in Europe, at least since the s, migration has become an issue, mainly because two-thirds of the migrants are Muslims.
It is in this context that far-right parties emerged and started to garner support in presenting migration as a threat. In reaction, Western European states began erecting new defences against the much mediatised threat of mass immigration by strengthening direct immigration control through severe visa regimes, internal surveillance and outsourcing border control on the external borders of the EU. But all cordons sanitaires put in place could not stop or even slow the flow of irregular migration from southern countries.
The long land border and coastlines of many European states hindered the effective policing of frontiers. In many cases, land and maritime controls only served to displace the routes of migration, making the travel longer and riskier and making traffickers richer as they showed their ability to adapt to the new regulations. Southern European countries were particularly exposed to irregular migration.
But later, in the s, they became countries of final destination for waves of irregular migrants. But hundred of thousands made it. They lived in precarious situations, as illegals, irregulars or indocumentados , but over the years, they have been legalised, in what Spain has called regularizacion , and Italy, sanatoria.
In this respect, the case of Spain is emblematic as the number of asentados Moroccans, to take just one example, jumped from The same happened in Italy. Undoubtedly, restrictive visa regimes affected legal migration but triggered irregular migration. Externalised control of migration and detention camps have not discouraged migrants. It is, therefore, not surprising that today, there are more than one million Muslims in Spain and a similar figure in Italy.
The problem has become more acute recently with the substantial increase of asylum seekers from impoverished or devastated countries in the South, like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and even the Gaza Strip. While the Mediterranean is being transformed into a cemetery of drowned dreams, European countries are bickering about the cost-sharing of land borders and coastline policing and about distributing asylum seekers among European states.
Let us recognise that the challenge is daunting since defensive and protective policies in the Mediterranean did not succeed in deterring asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. European leaders found themselves caught between alarmed rejectionists, who invoke financial costs, security risks and social challenges and who ask for more muscular policies to stem the flow of mass immigration, and vocal refugee advocates, who posit the problem in terms of human dignity and the necessity to protect, recalling the example of Jordan and Lebanon, which are hosts to more than a million Syrian refugees each.
There is no doubt that the situation is difficult to manage. On the one hand, in face of the magnitude of the human tragedy, Europe cannot remain blind, deaf and with its arms crossed. On the other, it cannot leave its doors wide open to the misery of the world. This historical review clearly shows that through natural increase and new migration flows, in all their forms, the Muslim population is increasing rapidly in the European Union to the bewilderment of European states, caught off guard by the sheer numbers of refugees and asylum seekers.
One can easily bet that the anxieties which surround the migration issue will not vanish as long as neighbouring Muslim countries remain feverish and destabilised and as long as European Islam is constructed as a problem. In France alone, there are some From January to August , In this article, we shall deal only with Muslims of migrant origin in the European Union. They fall into three categories: a those who are registered as foreigners; b those who acquired the nationality of the country where they live and work; and, finally, c those who are native European.
On the whole, I estimate that there are some 23 million Muslims living in the 28 European states, three-quarters of whom are already European citizens by naturalisation or birth.
To these numbers, we may add some 2 million Muslims who migrated illegally and have not yet been officially legalised. These numbers are not threatening. Right wing parties are not saying anything else. Is there a reason for concern? For many Europeans, the answer is yes, not only because of the increasing number of Muslims in Europe, but also because Europeans greatly overestimate the share of Muslims in the total population.
Some demographers are not less anxious. They recognise that the total Muslim population is projected to jump from 25 to 35 million between and They invoke both internal and external factors. They also argue that Muslim women marry in larger numbers and at younger age and divorce less than their non-Muslim counterparts. To these internal factors, one must add net migration influx.
As a matter of fact, current migration pressures are not caused exclusively by external push factors, such as poverty, conflict and repression. The current focus on push factors diverts attention away from significant pull factors, such as the very fact that the European countries are already hosts to significant immigrant or immigrant-origin populations, opening new channels for migration.
To this reality, one has to add travel accessibility, expanding international networks and the fact that there is still demand at the upper end of the labour market for highly qualified professionals, and at the lower end, there is demand for workers in unregulated sectors of the economy, which depend on a cheap and exploitable workforce to remain competitive.
Clearly, migration pressures from Muslim and non Muslim countries will not diminish any time soon. From the very beginning of labour migration, in the s and s, European states have adopted different policies with respect to managing their immigrants and integrating them.
Some countries, like Germany, did little in the first decade to facilitate the integration of its migrants. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands embraced the notion of multiculturalism, by which the governments sought to maintain distinct cultural identities and customs.
France, by contrast, professed a policy of assimilation by imposing its model of secularism. The social unrest was almost concomitant with the terrorist attacks in Madrid and in London, serving as eye-openers and questioning old integration models. Whatever the model, the immigrants, as I said earlier, gathered in ethnic neighbourhoods, called banlieues , in France, and suburbs, in England. After the economic downturn of the s, and the closure of mines and factories, immigrants became the first to bear the brunt of the crisis.
Although a large number of the rioters appeared to be Muslims, most observers agree that urban segregation and the lack of opportunity and upward social mobility were key factors behind the unrest. The social unrest was almost concomitant with the deadly terrorist attacks in Madrid, in , and in London, in France had already suffered similar terrorist attacks in Holland and Denmark were not spared, with the assassination of filmmakers and cartoonists.
These tragic events served as eye-openers. Old integration models came under attack. Multiculturalism in the UK and in Holland has been questioned, and gradually, the policy has been abandoned, and governments have stepped up their efforts to better integrate their Muslim communities. Germany relaxed its naturalisation policy and allowed Turks and Kurds to acquire German nationality.
Only France stuck to its secular model. Undoubtedly, in the last 15 years, the issue of migration and integration policies has dominated the political and intellectual debate, with two questions gaining particular momentum: Are European Muslims discriminated and segregated? And, if so, should the European states be held responsible?
As the bulk of Muslims are labour immigrants or native-born of immigrant origin, they are poorer than the national average, and they often live in segregated neighbourhoods. However, it is also true that poverty is often linked to poor parental control, dropping out of school and the lack of opportunities. In addition, there was an alarming development in the s. The migrants, whose problems were seen as a consequence of their socio-economic status during the preceding decades, started to be perceived as culturally different.
The apparent failure to integrate has been viewed in cultural terms, that is, as failure to adapt to European culture and to adopt European norms, values and styles.
In other words, Muslims do not integrate because they are Muslims, and Islam is perceived as incompatible with Western culture and values. Thus, it is no surprise that Islam has been constructed as a problem.
This shift in perception is synchronic with the advent, since , of the so-called Islamic revival. However, there is no one Muslim community in Europe; this is a fantasy. Muslims come from different countries, live in different countries and speak different languages. They are immensely divided in their faith, in their ethnicity and also in their relation to religious practice and to the role religion plays in their lives.
It is therefore erroneous to remove the migrant from his own condition. A migrant born to Algerian migrant parents with French nationality is first of all French. So why should we encage him in a Muslim community supposedly closed and fixed forever? Speaking constantly of Muslim community means that Islam eclipses the individual Muslim as the presumed actor of social and political change.
Such a postulate is both erroneous and dangerous, not only because Islam assumes the role of an internal enemy in a societal cold war between European societies and their Muslims, but also because the integration issue is disconnected from the socio-economic context and becomes the sole responsibility of Muslims. Happily enough, many Muslims are fighting their way into European societies and gradually integrating their norms. Many success stories of Muslims in all sectors, from economy to culture, provide ample proof that there is no Muslim fatality.
Muslims with higher education and higher wages—like the Unfortunately, the bulk of Muslims in Europe are labour migrants or sons of labour migrants who are badly equipped to better integrate into European societies, not because of Islam, but because of their socio-economic condition. Should we, therefore, incriminate official policies for the lack of integration?
I believe so, to a certain extent.
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